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time to read: 10 min

Introduction

The Arctic is becoming an increasingly important geostrategic region, facing more threats than ever. As climate change advances, the polar ice caps are melting, opening up valuable natural resources and potential maritime shipping routes. Accordingly, the Arctic has caught the attention of adversarial states like China and Russia, pursuing advanced military and scientific projects in the North, and challenging Canada’s sovereignty and security. These developments have coincided with an erosion of the rules-based international order, marked by Russia’s 2022 ongoing invasion of Ukraine and China’s aggressive strategy in the South China Sea. With the return to great power competition, increased militarization and competition over Arctic resources is becoming a reality, necessitating a strong Arctic security architecture. Despite its pivotal role in defending North America through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Canada has faced challenges adapting to emerging security threats in the Arctic.

This policy brief examines the emerging security risks in the Canadian Arctic. This brief begins by providing an overview of Canada's emerging threats in the Arctic. Next, it highlights the limitations of NORAD’s current capabilities, focusing on aging infrastructure, surveillance, and implementation gaps for NORAD modernization. I conclude by providing policy recommendations on NORAD modernization for the Department of National Defence (DND).

Emerging Threats in the Arctic

There are several emerging threats to Canada’s Arctic. The first threat is China’s ambition-to-revisionism pipeline. For the last two decades, China has shown increasing interest in the Arctic, marked by its repeated investments in mining and scientific exploration, and its 2018 proclamation as a “near-Arctic” state. In recent years, China has collaborated with Russia in the region, establishing the Sino-Russian Arctic Research Center in 2019 and collaborating on China’s “Polar Silk Road,” a project to develop Arctic shipping routes (Foreign Affairs Committee 2022). Russia and China have also collaborated in the development of under-ice acoustics and Arctic mining projects, including Russia’s Arctic liquified natural gas (LNG) 2 project (Puranen and Kopra 2023, 246). The Sino-Russian alliance in the Arctic is worrisome, given that both nations flout the rules-based international order. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there has been a deeper geopolitical divide between democracies and authoritarian regimes, and it is possible that together, Russia and China could exceed NORAD’s defence capabilities. Indeed, Russia’s military bases outnumber NATO bases in the Arctic Circle, and China’s Arctic technology is more advanced than Canada’s (Gronholt-Pederson & Fouche 2022). 

Sino-Russian military and technological advancements are another emerging threat to the Canadian Arctic. China and Russia have advanced hypersonic and long-range cruise missiles which are designed to evade detection. Russia’s Zircon hypersonic reportedly travels at nine times the speed of sound, far faster than the North Warning System's (NWS) detection capabilities (Reuters 2024). Beyond explicit military innovation, China has developed various dual-use technologies in the Arctic. China’s Xuelong icebreaker conducts Arctic expeditions for ‘scientific exploration’ (Puranen and Kopra 2023, 246). However, Chinese icebreakers are likely more interested in identifying natural resources in the Arctic than in advancing scientific understanding. New Chinese icebreakers are now equipped with deep-diving submersibles, meaning that China could use listening devices to interfere with underwater cables and evade detection from Canada due to a lack of similar deep-diving technologies (Huebert 2023). China’s underwater listening systems have become so advanced that they can likely now detect allied submarines in the Arctic. Despite these innovations' “peaceful” purposes, these technologies can concurrently advance China’s geopolitical interests. Given that Canada has already flagged Chinese surveillance efforts in high altitude balloons and monitoring buoys, it should be cautious in giving the benefit of the doubt when it comes to dual-use technology.

What are NORAD’s shortcomings?

Canada could strengthen its Arctic security by improving NORAD's capabilities. NORAD’s equipment is outdated, and neither its aerial nor maritime surveillance capabilities can adequately detect emerging threats in the Arctic.

Regarding aerial capabilities, the North Warning System (NWS) of radars is meant to detect high-altitude threats. However, in 2023, it initially failed to detect the Chinese high altitude balloon (HAB) that flew over North America (Charron 2023). The NWS is over forty years old and has not been updated to respond to newer, low-altitude threats like hypersonic and cruise missiles. Aerial blind spots also plague the system because the technology struggles to accommodate Earth’s curvature (Charron 2023). The Arctic’s terrain and harsh conditions exacerbate these blind spots. In short, NORAD’s NWS is too outdated to effectively detect and respond to security threats in Canada’s Arctic.

Concerning maritime surveillance, Canada lacks effective under-ice capabilities. While NORAD has previously relied on the US Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)—now known as the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)—to monitor underwater activity, neither system was designed for under-ice terrain. Similarly, Canada has used sonar technology to monitor underwater activity in different environments. However, the ice cover, loud acoustics, and the high temperatures of the Arctic limit its effectiveness in polar environments (Gricius 2024). The complex environmental conditions of the Arctic make surveillance challenging, requiring more advanced, terrain-specific technology. For instance, Canada lacks an advanced network of fixed acoustic sensors in the Arctic, which is critical for consistent under-ice surveillance (Leblanc 2021). Finally, nuclear submarines are another valuable tool for under-ice surveillance due to their prolonged submersion capabilities and exemplary speed and energy capacity. Nuclear submarines starkly contrast Canada’s Victoria-class submarines, which are less effective in sustained under-ice operations (Vanguard 2022). While Canada has relied on allies like the U.S, which possesses greater underwater listening technology and nuclear submarines, resources are thinly stretched, and Canada’s under-ice surveillance is riddled with security gaps.

Canada’s NORAD Modernization Plans

While NORAD’s shortcomings are worrisome for Canada’s Arctic, there are efforts to modernize NATO. Canada’s 2017 Defence Policy “Strong, Secure Engaged,” and its subsequent update in 2024 emphasize Arctic security, detailing extensive NORAD modernization efforts. The Canadian government has promised several important innovations for Arctic aerial defence. First, the government has pledged to collaborate with the United States to modernize the North Warning System (NWS). While the exact modifications are not clearly stated, the Canadian government is seeking an “innovative technological solution,” especially regarding early warning (Department of National Defence 2017, 79). Further, Canada has pledged to expand the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) to cover the entire Canadian Arctic Archipelago, improving air traffic surveillance in Canada’s sovereign Arctic airspace (Department of National Defence 2017, 80). Along with introducing more aircrafts to conduct anti-submarine warfare, Canada has started developing Over-the-Horizon radars to help provide early warning radar coverage for technologies like cruise missiles (Department of National Defence 2024).

Canada has also made defence commitments for maritime threats in the Arctic. Canada has implemented the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) project, which involves acquiring five to six Arctic offshore patrol ships, in addition to the construction of two polar icebreakers

(Public Services and Procurement Canada 2024). To improve underwater surveillance, Canada pledged to incrementally modernize and operate the four Victoria-class submarines (Department of National Defence 2017 108). In 2024, Canada, the US and Finland signed the ICE Pact, aimed at building polar icebreakers and improving information sharing in the region. Finally, the Canadian government is working on improving underwater listening technology through the development of specialized maritime sensors (Global Affairs Canada 2024). Much of Canada’s planned improvements for NORAD involve bilateral cooperation in technology and innovation with the United States.

The Problems That Remain

Canada’s NORAD modernization plans are impressive but flawed. First, they are too vague. The Government of Canada (GoC) claims it will update the NWS but does not specify how. Similarly, the GoC has committed to investing in undersea surveillance technologies but does not specify what technology it will invest in or how long it will take. A short timeline is critically important given that Canadian sonar systems do not have optimal under-ice listening capabilities (Rooke 2024). The GoC uses similarly vague language to describe Canada-US coordination on NORAD modernization, offering little assurance that these developments will occur promptly.

Canada’s NORAD modernization plan also suffers from implementation gaps. Canada has many innovation plans for NORAD. However, the timelines for operational effectiveness are long and leave security gaps in the interim. For instance, Canada’s Arctic and Polar Over-the-Horizon Radar systems are projected to be operational in the early 2030s (Department of National Defence 2023). Many of these kinds of technological developments get pushed back and end up taking longer than intended. Similarly, the enhancement of satellite communications in the Arctic is projected to be operational in 2040 (Department of National Defence 2023). In short, the planned improvements to Canada’s Arctic defence will not be realized for at least 5 to 15 years. As the geopolitical importance of the Arctic increases and Sino-Russian collaboration in the Arctic deepens, the next five years will be critically important for Arctic defence. Canada needs security assurances now.

Finally, Canada lacks the infrastructure to modernize NORAD adequately. Roads, seaports, and digital connectivity are missing but important to secure the Arctic. Many Inuit communities lack fibre optic cables, power lines and roads that connect them to the rest of Canada (Exner-Pirot & Carson 2024). As climate change alters the Arctic landscape, there will be increasing challenges around accessibility and mobility, provoking a need for timely infrastructural innovation (McDonald 2024). Canada must improve fibre optics and satellites to strengthen Arctic communication systems. The GoC must also ensure that military and road infrastructure is developed promptly and in collaboration with local Indigenous communities. By focusing on infrastructural developments, Canada can see the full effectiveness of its plans for NORAD.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The Canadian Arctic is at the heart of geopolitical competition. Climate change is introducing new challenges to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. These are challenges that NORAD is unequipped to address. With threats from China and Russia, whose military and technological advancements surpass NORAD’s surveillance capabilities, Canada must adapt to ensure it can adequately protect its Arctic territory. While Canada has developed ambitious and extensive plans to modernize NORAD and bolster Arctic security, critical issues remain, including vague modernization strategies, implementation gaps and critical infrastructure deficiencies. This policy brief addressed the emerging threats in the Arctic, NORAD’s current blind spots and the anticipated challenges in implementing the NORAD modernization plans. My policy recommendations for DND are summarized below.

Foster Greater Cooperation with Arctic Allies

Modernizing NORAD will take time and money. To offset these costs, Canada should collaborate with its NATO allies in the Arctic (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States), expanding joint exercises and information sharing, which will improve interoperability. By working with allies, Canada could benefit from technology sharing in undersea surveillance, bolstering the security of the entire Arctic Archipelago. Canada could also increase information sharing with the Five Eyes Alliance.

Prioritize Under-Ice Surveillance

The unique terrain in the Arctic creates a surveillance challenge. Canada’s current capabilities in the Arctic are not optimized for prolonged surveillance under ice cover. Canada should prioritize improving sub-polar surveillance infrastructure to respond to the emerging threat of Chinese underwater surveillance through deep-diving submersibles and autonomous aquatic vehicles. Modernizing NORAD will take time, and covert, under-sea surveillance threats are more material than a full-scale missile attack in the near future.

Improving underwater acoustics and fibre optic cables is the first step to strengthening under-sea surveillance. While Canada cannot achieve a comprehensive underwater acoustics framework overnight, the GoC should identify strategic chokepoints or blind spots in underwater surveillance and deploy a series of fixed underwater acoustic arrays to expand surveillance coverage.

Next, the GoC should consider acquiring nuclear submarines. Though expensive and against the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they are valuable assets. The current Victoria-Class submarines do not have the energy capacity for extended under-ice surveillance and modernizing them will not fix the fact that they are diesel-powered. Nuclear submarines can sustain prolonged under-ice surveillance and are much quicker than the Victoria-class submarines. They would immediately bolster under-sea surveillance and make the Canadian Arctic more secure. Presently, Canada benefits from America’s nuclear submarines in the shared regions of the Arctic. However, the Canadian Arctic Archipelago faces new threats requiring comprehensive undersea surveillance, and nuclear submarines are becoming more necessary. With declining Canada-US relations amid Donald Trump’s second term, Canada might need to consider acquiring its own nuclear submarines. Acquiring nuclear submarines could also be an effort towards joining AUKUS.

Addressing the Implementation Gap

The implementation of NORAD modernization will be gradual. The Canadian government needs more timely solutions in the interim to bolster preparedness against the rising threat of China and Russia. The GoC should begin by improving Arctic infrastructure to ensure that new NORAD innovations can be supported. Canada should take a bottom-up approach and engage with Indigenous partners in the Arctic to help develop basic grid infrastructure that will serve a civilian-military dual use. High priorities should include expanding road infrastructure, investing in small modular reactors (SMR) for energy reliability, improving fibre-optic subsea cables, and implementing broadband in the Arctic for consistent connectivity. These investments in Arctic infrastructure must involve the provision of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) with Indigenous communities, who can incorporate invaluable local Indigenous knowledge.

Improve Information Transparency

Until recently, the connection between climate security, NORAD modernization, and the security and sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic has been sidelined. Few voters understand the geopolitical importance of the Canadian Arctic and how vulnerable it is. This leaves a critical informational asymmetry between policy-makers and Canadian voters, who influence the implemented policies. To mitigate this information gap, the next Canadian Defence Policy document should include a section that details the geopolitical importance of Canada’s Arctic, touching on the global race for green minerals and China’s overwhelming dominance in such minerals. The document should connect geopolitical tensions in the Arctic to NORAD’s outdated capabilities, increasing awareness about the emerging threats facing the Canadian Arctic from China.

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