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Trading in Disorder: A Trade Strategy for Navigating U.S. Protectionism and Chinese Industrial Policy

April 13-15, 2026 | In-person at the Donald Gordon Hotel and Conference Centre | Virtually via Zoom

2025 has been the most challenging year for Canadian trade policy in living memory. Canada finds itself at what its Prime Minister Mark Carney has called a “hinge moment” in its international economic relations. It is facing a fundamentally changed United States—a United States that is willing to impose tariffs on key Canadian exports, including autos, steel, aluminum, and lumber, and that can no longer be trusted to keep any agreements that it negotiates. At the same time, Canada has only just reached détente with China, its second largest trading partner. Canadian farmers and seafood industries are hoping for relief from China’s retaliatory tariffs while the auto industry is bracing itself for the arrival of a (limited number of) electric vehicles from China’s industry-leading firms on the Canadian market—and cautiously hoping for Chinese investment in the sector. 

Beyond the immediate trade challenges, the return of US protectionism and the rise of China as an industrial powerhouse are forcing Canada to reconsider foundational assumptions of its trade policy. Canada can no longer develop its trade policy around an economic and security alliance with the United States that it used to take for granted. And China’s ability to dominate one industrial sector after another is testing Canada’s commitment to its legal obligations in the World Trade Organization (WTO)—commitments that Canada entered at a time when the prospect of competition from an economy with China’s unique characteristics was not on anyone’s radar.

For Canadian trade officials, the new disorder presents numerous challenges. They need to contain the damage in Canada’s relationship with its two largest trading partners while simultaneously preparing for the possibility of an even more comprehensive rupture, including as a result of the review of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Canada also needs to double down on partnerships with other trading partners while guarding against the risk of trade diversion as these partners manage their own fractious relationships with the two major powers. All this means that Canadian trade officials need to develop both long-term strategies and short-term practical solutions in an environment of radical uncertainty.  

The purpose of the 2026 edition of the Queen’s Institute on Trade Policy is to prepare trade officials to navigate this new disorder. The first part of the Institute will survey the impact of the United States’ new trade policy and China’s industrial policy and trade retaliation on Canada’s economy. The second part of the Institute will explore the major policy issues raised by US and Chinese policies. The final part of the Institute will discuss the implications of these developments for Canada’s trade strategy.

For full conference details and information about registration and accommodations, please see the ����ֱ�� Institute on Trade Policy webpage.